Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1999

Glauser Storage v. Dale T. Smedley : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
T. Richard Davis; Callister Nebeker and McCullough; Attorneys for Appellants.
Craig L. Taylor; Roger W. Griffin; Attorneys for Appellees.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Glauser Storage v. Smedley, No. 990544 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1999).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2227

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Glauser Storage, L.L.C., a Utah Limited
Liability Company, dba Mountain View
Storage; Steven D. Glauser, an individual;
Kristine G. Lofts, an individual; Richard M.
Glauser, an individual; Susan G. Larsen, an
individual; Craig K. Glauser, an individual
Plaintiffs/Appellees,
ARGUMENT PRIORITY 15
vs.

Civil N. 990544CA

Dale T. Smedley, an individual; and
DOES I - X.
Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL BY THE DEFENDANT FROM THE JUDGMENT, ORDER AND
DECREE ENTERED BY THE HONORABLE MICHAEL G. ALLPHIN ON
MAY 18,1999

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/
APPELLANT
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH
T. Richard Davis (USB No. 0836)
GATEWAY TOWER EAST, SUITE 900
10 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84133
Telephone (801) 530-7300

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS/
APPELLEES
Craig L. Taylor (USB No. 4421)
Roger W. Griffin (USB No. 6554)
CRAIG L. TAYLOR, P.C.
447 NORTH 300 WEST, SUITE 3
KAYSVILLE, UTAH 84037
Telephone: (801) 544-9955

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

MAR 2 7 2000
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Julia D'Alesandro
Clerk of the Court

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Glauser Storage, L.L.C., a Utah Limited
Liability Company, dba Mountain View
Storage; Steven D. Glauser, an individual;
Kristine G. Lofts, an individual; Richard M.
Glauser, an individual; Susan G. Larsen, an
individual; Craig K. Glauser, an individual
Plaintiffs/Appellees,
ARGUMENT PRIORITY 15
vs.
Civil N. 990544CA
Dale T. Smedley, an individual; and
DOES I - X.
Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL BY THE DEFENDANT FROM THE JUDGMENT, ORDER AND
DECREE ENTERED BY THE HONORABLE MICHAEL G. ALLPHIN ON
MAY 18,1999
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/
APPELLANT
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH
T. Richard Davis (USB No. 0836)
GATEWAY TOWER EAST, SUITE 900
10 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84133
Telephone (801) 530-7300

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS/
APPELLEES
Craig L. Taylor (USB No. 4421)
Roger W. Griffin (USB No. 6554)
CRAIG L. TAYLOR, P.C.
447 NORTH 300 WEST, SUITE 3
KAYSVILLE, UTAH 84037
Telephone: (801) 544-9955

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS

1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

6

ARGUMENT

7

POINT I
The trial court committed reversible error in refusing to allow
Smedley to submit both testimony and document evidence to
show the intentions of Smedley and Glausers concerning the
Davis County Property Conveyance

7

POINT II
The trial court committed reversible error in deeming
inadmissible and not considering the evidence presented by
Smedley showing the existence and value of alternative
performance consideration delivered by Smedley and
accepted by Glausers
CONCLUSION

,
15
20
<

(

i
279837.1

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases Cited
Battiston v. American Land and Development Co., 607 P.2d 837 (Utah 1980)
Baker v. Taggart, 628 P.2d 1283 (Utah 1981)

19
9

Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415 (Utah App. 1994)

19

Cal Wadsworth Construction v. City of St. George, 898 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1995)

14

Cowles v. Zlaket, 334 P.2d 55 (Cal. App. 1959)
Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102 (Utah 1984)

8
19

Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 557 P.2d 156 (Utah 1976)

9

Kline v. Robinson, 428 P.2d 190 (Nev. 1967)

8

Kjar v. Brimley, 497 P.2d 23 (Utah 1972)

7, 8

Openshaw v. Openshaw, 144 P.2d 528 (Utah 1943)

18

Papanikolas Brothers Enterprises v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associates,
535 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1975)

18

Realty Enterprises, Inc. v. New Century Realty, Inc., 652 P.2d 918 (Utah 1982)

19

Rizo v. McBeth, 398 P.2d 209 (Alaska 1965)

8

State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1987)

15

Winegar v. Froerer, 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991)

ii
279837.1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6, 10, 12

Statutes and Rules
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence

15, 16

Rule 601 of the Utah Rules of Evidence

15, 16

Other
S. Nelson & D. Witman, Real Estate Finance Law 44 (2d ed. 1985)

10

4
iii
279837.1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS
Smedley has submitted an accurate Statement of Material Facts in his Brief of
Appellant on file herein. The facts set forth by Appellees differ in many respects from
those offered by Smedley. However, rather than identify each minute difference, the
following Supplemental Statement of Material facts is offered to correct only the
inaccurate fact statements included in the Brief for Appellees which are crucial to the
issues and arguments of this appeal.
1.

The 1979 transaction between Smedley and Glausers, which is the genesis

for this case, was intended to be a purchase of the Davis County Property by Smedley
from Glausers (T. 136-140). Although Smedley and Glausers formally structured the
purchase as a land exchange (Exhibit 1), the available1 evidence clearly shows that the
transaction was a financed purchase of the Davis County Property, secured by the Davis
County Property and other collateral, to be paid in regular monthly guaranteed
installments, annual payments, and additional ongoing personal service obligations
undertaken by Smedley.
2.

Under the 1979 transaction, Glausers sold the Melanie Acres Property to

Smedley, in return for which Smedley agreed to deliver the following consideration:

^medley was prevented from submitting relevant evidence as to the intended
character of the transaction by the trial court's ruling on Appellees' Motion in Limine and
further evidentiary rulings during the trial. See Argument, Point I, below.

1
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a..

Monthly installment payments of not less than $2,000 per month

together with one-half of all of the additional net profits earned from the storage units
which are located on the Davis County Property (T. 136);
b.

Annual payment of $6,000 for vacations to be enjoyed by Glausers

and their guests (T. 134, 136);
c.

Absolute conveyance of the Davis County Property by warranty deed

to Glausers, to be held as security for the faithful performance of the obligations
undertaken by Smedley (T. 139, 167);
d.

Management of the Davis County Property, including repairs,

maintenance, payment of taxes, accounting, and the collection of rents from the tenants of
the storage units (T. 137); and
e.

Pledge of a $300,000 escrow account to further assure Smedley's

timely performance of his obligations (T. 136).
<

3.

Most, but not all, of the above terms were included in the 1979 Agreement,

prepared by Glausers' attorney and signed by Glausers and Smedley (Exhibit 1).
mr

4.

By March 1980, the parties had amended their 1979 Agreement and agreed

<

to substitute a pledge of the Salmon Property as collateral further securing Smedley's
payment obligations to Glausers (T. 145, 147, Exhibit 4).

1
2
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5.

Although there was no written amendment to the 1979 Amendment, all of

the parties to this case have stipulated to its existence, and the trial court ultimately
acknowledged the "security" nature of the Salmon Property conveyance (R. 424, Tf 34).
6.

Over the next 14 years, Smedley faithfully undertook and substantially

performed the material obligations of the 1979 transaction, including the regular payment
of each monthly installment, the general repair and maintenance of the Davis County
Property, and the maintenance of the Salmon Property (T. 151-154).
7.

However, due to unforeseen economic developments and severe health

problems encountered by Smedley, he eventually became delinquent in his payments of
taxes on both the Salmon Property and on the Davis County Property, and in the annual
vacation pay (T. 175).
8.

The cash-poor Smedley agreed to provide other substitute compensation to

repay Glausers from the financial defaults:
a.

Conveyance of three unimproved lots: one Cottonwood Lot and two

Smedley Estate Lots, (the "Additional Lots") (T. 156-162, Exhibits 36, 37, 38); and
b.

Provision of labor and materials necessary to construct subdivision

improvements upon two separate real estate developments then owned and being
developed by Glausers: the Lakeview Project and the Heritage Project (the "Project
Improvements") (T. 163).

3
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9.

Glausers approved Smedley's substitute performance as set forth above and,

therefore, paid no other consideration to Smedley in return for the conveyance of the
Additional Lots or the Project Improvements (T. 160-162).
10.

No billing statement, contract, invoice, canceled check, memorandum was

produced by either party concerning the consideration owing from or paid by Glausers to
Smedley for the Additional Lots and the Project Improvements.
11.

Although Appellees consistently testified to the meticulous record keeping

of Mel Glauser, and Glausers' alleged disappointment in Smedley's performance under
the 1979 Agreement, Glausers produced absolutely no evidence that Glausers ever
mentioned this "disappointment" to Smedley or demanded strict payment of any of the
unpaid tax or vacation obligations under the 1979 Agreement (T. 42, 47-49, 105).
12.

Smedley reasonably believed that by Glausers' acceptance of the Additional

Lots and Project Improvements as substitute performance for the tax on vacation
obligations, he had received frill compensation for the Additional Lots and the Project
Improvements. Smedley held that belief until Appellees made their unexpected demands
for payment following the deaths of the Glausers (T. 162, 166).
13.

Smedley did not unreasonably delay in the assertion of his claims of frill

payment and satisfaction of his obligations because he was unaware of any unpaid
obligations until he received Appellees' initial demand for payment (T. 167-170).

4
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14.

Glausers and their successors, Appellees, unreasonably delayed in their

demand for strict performance of Smedley's payment obligations under the 1979
Agreement by accepting the substitute performance and making no demand or claim of
default until after the death of the Glausers and the alleged destruction of Glausers'
business documents (T. 166-168).
15.

The trial court prevented Smedley from introducing any evidence at trial of

the true financing nature of the 1979 transaction (R. 226, 263-275, T. 235-236).
16.

Smedley's trial evidence introduced concerning the existence and values of

the substitute performance in the form of Additional Lots and the Project Improvements
was uncontradicted, yet deemed inadmissible and ignored by the trial court (R. 436-438).
17.

Notwithstanding the trial court's correct finding that the Salmon Property

was held by Glausers merely as collateral securing Smedley's obligations, the fact that
Glausers materially damaged the Salmon Property through an uncompensated conveyance
of a substantial portion thereof to third-party Billy Isley, was also ignored by the trial
court (R. 425,^| 38-41).
18.

Smedley timely objected to the trial court's Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law concerning the Court's refusal to admit or consider the offered
evidence concerning the Additional Lots, the Project Improvements and the unauthorized
and uncompensated conveyance of a portion of the Salmon Property (R. 312-324).

5
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erroneously ruled prior to the commencement of the bench trial
herein, that Smedley would be unable to introduce any evidence which would vary, alter
or supplement the terms of the warranty deed and the written Agreement concerning the
conveyance of the Davis County Property by Smedley to Glausers. That ruling was again
reaffirmed during trial when Smedley attempted to introduce testimony concerning the
security nature of the Davis County Property conveyance. The trial court failed to follow
the well-settled law of this State which requires that a trial court consider parol evidence
even without a showing of mistake, fraud or ambiguity in the conveying document.
Winegar v. Froerer, 813 P.2d 104,110 (Utah 1991) As a recognized exception to the parol
evidence rule, the trial court should have admitted otherwise admissible parol evidence to
show the intentions of the party. An analysis of all the available evidence (including that
erroneously refused by the court) would have clearly demonstrated that it was the intent
of both parties that the conveyance by warranty deed of the Davis County Property was
accompanied with an oral understanding that Glausers would hold the deed only as
security and reconvey it to Smedley once Smedley's payment obligations were satisfied.
The trial court also erroneously failed to admit or consider the unrebutted
testimony presented on behalf of Smedley to show that substitute payments were
provided and accepted by Glausers, fully satisfying previous payment defaults of

6
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Smedley in his property tax and vacation funding obligations. There was no
contradictory evidence offered to the absolute nature of the conveyances of three separate
unimproved lots to Glausers. Neither was there any disagreement concerning the fact that
Smedley provided to Glausers work and materials valued in excess of $94,000 without
reimbursement. Testimony was offered even from the Plaintiffs' themselves to the fact
that at least a portion of the substitute payments were intended to have been used to
satisfy prior tax payment defaults. The trial court's reliance on Rules 403 and 601 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence do not support the court's findings. The offered direct, nonhearsay evidence should have been admitted and thereafter considered and weighed by
the court. By the precise language of the court's Findings and Conclusions, the trial court
documented its failure to consider admissible evidence.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
The trial court committed reversible error in refusing to allow
Smedley to submit both testimony and document evidence to show the
intentions of Smedley and Glausers concerning the Davis County
Property Conveyance
Appellees and the trial court have failed to grasp the substantive law of this State,
as consistently pronounced by the appellate courts, that a warranty deed instrument will
be treated as a mortgage if it is shown that it was so intended. With Kjar v. Brimley, 497
P.2d 23, 25 (Utah 1972), the Utah State Supreme Court first adopted the reasoning of

7
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surrounding jurisdictions2, in recognizing that a transaction structured as an outright
conveyance may be in fact be a "disguised" financing arrangement.
The law may imply a promise to repay a debt under particular
circumstances of any case, where it is clear that the lender had
relied on the property for his security, being satisfied that he is
protected by its high value in relation to the amount loaned. If
there be a large margin between the debt or sum advanced and the
value of the land conveyed, this represents an assurance of
payment stronger than any promise or bond of a necessitous
borrower or debtor.
* * *

In equity, a deed, absolute on its face, may be shown by parol
evidence to have been given for security purposes only; and if
such showing be made, equity will give effect to the intention of
the parties.
Id. at 25, 26.
The Kjar reasoning, as thereafter expanded and developed by the Utah appellate
courts, provides the basis for Smedley's claims in defense to Glausers' Complaint
regarding both the Davis County Property and the Salmon Property. The initial intended

{

transaction between Smedley and Mel Glauser was neither a land swap nor a reciprocal
real estate purchase. The clear singular objective of the parties in the 1979 transaction
was Smedley's purchase of the Melanie Acres property from Glauser in a carefully
constructed way so as to not only secure repayment of the purchase obligation owing by

2

Kline v. Robinson, 428 P.2d 190, 194 (Nev. 1967); Cowles v. Zlaket, 334 P.2d 55, 60
(Cal. App. 1959); Rizo v. McBeth, 398 P.2d 209, 212 (Alaska 1965).
4
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Smedley, but to also secure said obligation and to provide a long-term cash stream for the
remainder of the Glausers' joint lives. (T. 136-139).
A court will properly exercise its equitable powers to treat a deed as a mortgage if
it is shown that it was so intended. Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 557 P.2d 156, 158 (Utah
1976). "Whether a transaction is a sale, or a loan disguised as a sale, is a question
controlled by the intention of the parties as it existed at the time of the execution and
delivery of the instruments." Baker v. Taggart, 628 P.2d 1283, 1284 (Utah 1981).
In both Jacobsen and Baker, the district courts took evidence and heard testimony
at trial from the respective parties in their attempts to show, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the real intentions of the parties were to structure the conveyances of real
property from a debtor to a creditor for security purposes, rather than as outright
conveyances. In both cases the subject deeds conveyed to the lender were in the form of
"absolute conveyances," without any language in the subject instruments referring to a
security convention or right of reversion. In both cases, there was appropriate judicial
recognition that "a deed regular in form is presumed to convey the entire fee simple title."
Jacobsen, 557 P.2d at 158. However, in both cases, the trial courts correctly received
parol evidence offered to show the actual intent of the parties in light of the equitable
claims asserted. Eventually, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decisions in both
cases to refuse the constructive mortgage assertion, due to failure of the claimants to carry
the extremely high burden of proof required of the party seeking the equitable

9
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construction. It is important to note, however, that not withstanding the apparently
unambiguous language of the conveying instrument, both trial courts and the reviewing
Supreme Court approved of the admission of the claimants' parol evidence in its effort to
convincingly prove that the intentions of the parties differed from the language of the
instruments.
More recently in Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991), the Utah
Supreme Court recognized that an absolute deed with nothing more than an "oral
understanding" may be intended by parties to constitute a financing security instrument.
It is possible for a party to transfer a warranty deed without
intending to convey the property. Debtors, for example,
frequently execute absolute deeds of conveyance to creditors with
merely an oral understanding that the creditor will hold the deed
as security and reconvey it to the debtor once the obligation is
satisfied. S. Nelson & D. Witman, Real Estate Finance Law 44
(2d ed. 1985). These transactions occur to avoid the strict
requirements of the law of mortgages. Id. The case law in this
country "overwhelmingly establishes" that parol evidence is
admissible in equity to show that a deed, although absolute on
its face, was intended as a mortgage. Id. at 46. This rule
applies even though it was knowingly cast in the form of an
absolute conveyance, and was not effected by fraud, mistake,
ignorance, duress, or undue influence. Id.

,

813 P.2d at 110 (emphasis added). The Winegar Court clearly disagrees with Appellees'
contention that as a prerequisite to the admission of any parol evidence, there must first
be a showing of ambiguity, mistake, or fraud. Unlike the general contract construction

<
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cases cited in Appellees' Brief, the admissibility of parol evidence for the limited purpose
of showing the actual intentions of the parties to a real estate conveyance is absolute.
Smedley was denied his right to introduce parol evidence at trial to support his
claim. In the Smedley's Witness List, filed with the Court prior to trial (R. 212-215),
Smedley named three witnesses that would testify to the temporary and security nature of
Glausers' ownership of the Davis County Property: Smedley; his son, Terry Smedley (a
certified appraiser); and Smedley's former banker, Dennis Brown. The witness list
prompted Appellees' filing of a Motion in Limine on January 12, 1999, seeking the trial
court's order prohibiting any trial evidence contradicting the 1979 warranty deed which
conveyed the Davis County Property to Glausers (R. 263-275). Due to the proximity of
the trial, the Court scheduled a hearing on the Motion within seven days after its filing,
without the normal briefing opportunity. On January 19, 1999, the Court heard argument,
and took the matter under advisement. (R. 226). A ruling was communicated by
telephone to the parties on January 22, 1999, just six days before trial, and was never
reduced to a written order3. The oral ruling prohibited Smedley from introducing any
evidence to the effect that the 1979 deed to the Davis County Property was intended as

3

Although no written order was ever prepared or issued by the Court, the parties and
the Court referred to the ruling several times during the trial: ktBut I'm not going to recede
from my earlier ruling that the parol evidence rule is going to bar testimony that would
tend to go against that document itself as to the agreement that's contained within that
document." (T. 236).

11
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anything other than an absolute conveyance. The pre-trial ruling was tantamount to an
order of summary judgment on the most material and valuable issue in the case.
Because of and respecting the Court's ruling, Smedley came to trial without final
trial preparation on the Davis County Property issue. Smedley's banker, Mr. Brown, was
not prepared nor present to give testimony. Neither Smedley nor his son, Terry Smedley,
were prepared to offer testimony on the issue of the intentions of the parties surrounding
the 1979 conveyance, the 1979 value of the Davis County Property, and the parol
evidence demonstrating the true financing character of the transaction. Correspondence
and other collateral supporting documents concerning the relative values of the Melanie
Acres Property and the Davis County Property were neither gathered nor produced as
evidence. The Court's oral ruling preventing any parol evidence on the issue was clearly
in violation of the pronouncement in Winegar: "[P]arol evidence is admissible in equity
to show that a deed, although absolute on its face, was intended as a mortgage. This rule
applies even though it was knowingly cast in the form of an absolute conveyance, and
was not effected by fraud, mistake, ignorance, duress, or undue influence." 813 P.2d at
.110.

<
In their Brief, Appellees attempt to minimize the harm caused to Smedley because

of the Court's pre-trial error. They argue: "At trial, however, the Trial Court allowed
i

Smedley and his son to testify as to their understanding of the storage shed transaction.
After hearing the Smedley's parol testimony of contrary intent, the Court upheld its
<
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earlier decision to exclude the parol evidence." (Appellees' Brief at 16.) Later, Appellees
assert that based upon the brief and incomplete testimony that the Court temporarily
allowed from Smedley and Terry Smedley, that the Court "did, in fact, hear Smedley's
parol evidence attempting to contradict the 1979 Agreement and Warranty Deed."
(Appellees'Brief at 29-30)
Appellees fail in their attempt to minimize the harm caused by the Court's pre-trial
ruling. Mr. Brown, an unbiased, third-party witness, without the "self-serving"
motivation (about which Appellees continually complain) was unavailable. The limited
testimony of Smedley was received only "temporarily" by the trial court. When the issue
was first raised during the testimony of Terry Smedley, the following record was made:
A. [Terry Smedley] So when I read the contract, there was no
word about reversion. So I said, Dad thinks they are coming
back to him. This contract does not say that it's coming back
to him. So therefore, there is inconsistency. That's how we
got talking about these storage sheds.
Q. [Mr. Davis, Smedley's attorney] When you told him that,
what did Mel say?
Mr. Taylor [Appellees' Attorney]: I'm going to object again
on foundation and hearsay and also the parol evidence matter
that we've already been through.
The Court: Counsel, Mr. Davis, I've already made my ruling
regarding the parol evidence and I realize I let some in at least
temporarily before because you felt Mr. Taylor had opened
the door. But I'm not going to recede from my earlier ruling
that the parol evidence rule is going to bar testimony that
would tend to go against that document itself as to the

13
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agreement that's contained within that document. So Tin
going to sustain the earlier objection and sustain the objection
to this witness as well. So let's stay away from that.
(T. 235-236). Additionally, because of the pre-trial nature of the court's ruling,
documentary evidence and expert testimony concerning the relative values of the Davis
County Property and the Melanie Acres Property was neither completed nor presented.
By way of Appellees' opening the issue briefly at trial, then complaining when Smedley
attempted to take advantage of it, Appellees' appeal argument that Smedley has already
enjoyed his "day in court" is without substance. Had Smedley been allowed to prepare
and present credible evidence supporting his claim of constructive mortgage, each of the
elements set forth in Point I of the Argument and Addendum "2" in Appellant's Brief,
supporting the equitable construction of the warranty deed as a mortgage, could have
been presented with clear and convincing proof.
The Court's ruling prohibiting Smedley from offering such evidence was an error
in the application of Utah law, and one that irreparably impaired Smedley's ability to
present the necessary evidence to meet the high burden required of this claim. Smedley
believes that but for the trial court's refusal to allow the parol evidence, the outcome of
the trial as to the issue of the character of the Davis County Property would have been
different. This Court must reverse the Judgment of the trial court and allow Smedley to
present his case. Cal Wadsworth Construction v. City of St. George, 898 P.2d 1372, 1378
(Utah 1995).
i
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POINT II
The trial court committed reversible error in deeming
inadmissible and not considering the evidence presented
by Smedley showing the existence and value of alternative
performance consideration delivered by Smedley and
accepted by Glausers
The trial court committed reversible error when it deemed inadmissible all
evidence presented by Smedley to show (1) the existence of the substitute payment
performances delivered by Smedley to Glausers (2) the value of said performance, and (3)
the consent by Glausers to said performance as satisfaction of Smedley's obligations
under the 1995 agreement. The trial court based its erroneous ruling on Rules 403 and
601 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and the equitable doctrine of laches.
Rule 403 states:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its prohibitive
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
Inasmuch as this was a trial to the bench, there was no possibility that the dangers
addressed in this Rule would outweigh the trial court's ability to consider and weigh the
evidence. The Utah State Supreme Court has declared that this Rule not be used to allow
a trial court to exclude testimony simply because the court does not find it credible. In
State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187, 1190 (Utah 1987), the Court stated:

15
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Rule 403 is not to be used to allow the trial judge to substitute
his assessment of the credibility of testimony for that of the
jury by excluding testimony simply because he does not find it
credible.
From the express findings of the trial court (R. 412, ff 48, 150) it is clear that the court
did not even consider the substance of the presented testimony of Smedley. Rather, the
court simply deemed all testimony supporting Smedley's substitute performance
"inadmissible". That erroneous blanket determination of inadmissibility set forth in the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law conclusively documents the Court's refusal to
consider the non-hearsay, direct evidence, supporting Smedley's claims. By its own
language, the court refused to even admit the admissible evidence:
Rule 601 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
a. General Rule of Competency. Every person that is
competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in
these rules.
c. Statement of Deceased Declarant offered in an action
against Declarant's estate.
-1
a:i

(2) Evidence of a Statement [of a deceased declarant]
is inadmissible under this section if the statement was made
under circumstances such as to indicate its lack of
trustworthiness.

The direct testimony of Smedley, Terry Smedley, and various Glauser heirs as specifically
identified in Point II of the Argument section in the Brief of Appellant demonstrates,
without resort to any statement of either deceased declarant [Glausers], that Smedley
i
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indeed conveyed the Additional Lots (T. 25-26, 55, 163-165, Exhibits 19, 34) and
performed the Project Improvements (T. 42-43, 60-62, 156-158, Exhibits 36, 37)
consistent with the uncontradicted evidence. The value of Smedley's substitute
performance through the Additional Lots and the Project Improvements was established
with competent direct non-hearsay evidence outside of any statement made by either
deceased declarant [Glausers] (T. 11, 164, 166, 159-162). The acceptance of that
substitute performance was the subject of direct testimony by Smedley and uncontradicted
by Appellees despite the acknowledged ability of Glausers and their heirs to have
produced documents, notes and records allegedly kept by Glausers detailing the history of
business dealings between Smedley and the Glausers. Absolutely no evidence of any
demand, complaint or loss initiated by Glausers against Smedley prior to the death of
Glausers was ever produced contradicting Smedley's direct testimony that the substitute
performance was accepted in full satisfaction of his admitted delinquencies in vacation
and tax payments.
The final basis for the court's refusal to accept and consider Smedley's testimony
concerning the substitute performance is the equitable doctrine of laches.
Laches is not mere delay, but delay that works a disadvantage
to another. To constitute laches, two elements must be
established: (1) the lack of diligence on the part of plaintiff;
(2) An injury to defendant owing to such lack of diligence.
Although lapse of time is an essential part of laches, the
length of time must depend on the circumstances of each case,
for the propriety of refusing a claim is equally predicated
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upon the gravity of the prejudice suffered by defendant and
the length of plaintiff s delay.
Papanikolas Brothers Enterprises v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associates, 535 P.2d
1256, 1260 (Utah 1975). In Openshaw v. Openshaw, 144 P.2d 528, 531 (Utah 1943), the
Utah State Supreme Court acknowledged the importance of delay as an element of laches.
However, that court also recognized that "of equal importance are the circumstances
occurring during the delay, the relation of the parties to the subject, disadvantages that
may have come through loss of evidence, change of title, intervention of equities or injury
from other causes".
Appellees expend significant effort in their Brief describing the disadvantage to
which they have been placed because of the supposed tardiness of Smedley's assertion of
his substitute performance claims. Although Smedley acknowledges that Glausers are no
longer available to personally testify concerning Smedley's substitute performance,
Smedley did nothing to prevent Appellees from introducing the documentary evidence
which they concede had been kept by Glausers throughout their relationship with
Smedley. (T. 42, 47-48). Conveniently the documents kept by Mel Glauser concerning
his dealings with Smedley were intentionally destroyed by Glausers or Appellees just
prior to Glausers' deaths. (T. 48) Apparently, the assertions now made by Appellee were
either forgotten or non-existent just prior to Glausers' deaths.

(
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Recognizing, but not yet officially adopting the spoliation doctrine, this Court has
observed that "'where a party to an action fails to provide or destroys evidence favorable
to the opposing party, the court will infer the evidence's adverse content." Burns v.
Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah App. 1994). The purpose of the
spoliation doctrine is to discourage one party from wrongfully denying the other the
evidence necessary to establish facts in dispute. Id.
Inasmuch as Appellees are attempting to utilize principals of equity to restrict
otherwise competent evidence, they are also subject to the same principles and maxims of
equity which they attempt to enforce upon Smedley. "It is generally accepted that who
seeks equity must do equity." Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102, 107 (Utah 1984); u [0]ne
seeking equity must take care to discharge his own obligations regardless of mere
inconvenience." Realty Enterprises, Inc. v. New Century Realty, Inc., 652 P.2d 918, 920
(Utah 1982). "A court in equity will generally not assist one in extricating himself from
circumstances which he has created." Battiston v. American Land and Development Co.,
607 P.2d 837, 839 (Utah 1980).
Smedley testified that he had no knowledge of any outstanding obligation owing to
Glausers at the time of their deaths. (T. 162, 166) Appellees presented no written
document of any kind which had been delivered or presented to Smedley by Glausers
notifying him of unfulfilled expectations. Only after Glausers' deaths was Smedley
presented with demands, claims and a lawsuit to defend. Not surprisingly, prior to the
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time he was forced to defend stale claims, Smedley has never asserted by way of defense
to said claims his equally stale claims for full substitute performance.
Having delayed their assertion of claims of default, some of which predated
Glausers' death by almost ten years, Appellees should not be heard to object to the direct
testimony of Smedley concerning the satisfaction of those claims, even if that testimony
includes evidence of incidents that pre-dated Glausers' deaths.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, Smedley requests that this Court set aside the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued by Judge Allphin, reverse the Judgment
entered herein, and remand the matter for a new trial with instructions (1) that the District
Court allow Smedley to introduce relevant and credible evidence as to the true character
of the Davis County Property conveyance as supplemental to the written Agreement, (2)
that the District Court recognize and give Smedley credit for the Project Improvements
and Additional Lots conveyed to Glausers in full and substitute satisfaction of Smedley's
payment obligations under the Agreement, and (3) that the District Court refuse any

i

i
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attempt to introduce reputational evidence of Smedley which is not specifically required
to prove an element of Appellees' claims.
DATED this ^ day of March, 2000.
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH

T. Richard Davis
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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